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DR. KRISTIN SHRADER-FRECHETTE

Environmental Justice and Native
Americans: The Mescalero Apache
and Monitored Retrievable Storage'
ABSTRACT
In his articleon siting a monitored retrievablestorage (MRS) facility
for spent nuclear fuel on Mescalero Apache land, Noah Sachs
supportssome aspects of the project and criticizes others. While some
of his criticismsare defensible, most of his arguments supportingthe
facility are problematic. He argues (1) that paternalisticarguments
against the Mescalero MRS are flawed; (2) that because siting the
MRS does not amount to exploitationand bribery of the Mescalero,
it does not violate environmental justice; and (3) that siting the
Mescalero facility does not represent a more serious inequity than
siting it elsewhere in the East. This essay shows that all three claims
are ethically and factually questionable. Instead it argues (1) that
paternalistic arguments against the Mescalero MRS are ethically
justified; (2) that siting the MRS amounts to environmental
injustice;and (3) that siting the Mescalero facility represents a more
serious inequity than locating it in the East. The essay also argues
that errors (1), (2), and (3) arise because of historical,scientific, and
ethicalflaws in the analysis.
INTRODUCTION
As semi-sovereign nations within the United States Native
American tribes are not subject to state and local regulations, including
environmental regulations. Because they do not have strong environmental or zoning standards that compensate for their state and local exemptions-and because their typical unemployment is above 50 percent and
their per capita income is significantly below the national average-the
tribes are favorite targets for companies citing noxious facilities such as
waste dumps. Much of the time, the tribes fight back. The Navajo of
Dilkon, Arizona recently turned down an incinerator, as did the Kaw
Tribe in Oklahoma and the Paiute-Kaibab in Arizona. The Mississippi
Choctaw voted against a hazardous waste dump on their land, and the
* Distinguished Research Professor, Environmental Sciences and Policy Program, and
Department of Philosophy, 107 CPR. University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida 336205550.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

Mohawk of Canada and New York have battled at least nine waste
proposals. Waste companies have tried to persuade Chikaloon Village in
Alaska, the Moapa-Paiute, the Campo, the Standing Rock Sioux, and
many other tribes to accept white people's waste, including nuclear
waste.'
Surprisingly, when tribal leaders of the Mescalero Apache
orchestrated acceptance of a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility
for spent nuclear fuel; Noah Sachs defended aspects of the agreement. He
said (1) that paternalistic arguments against the Mescalero MRS are
flawed; (2) that because siting the MRS did not amount to exploitation
and bribery of the Mescalero, it did not violate environmental justice; and
(3) that siting the Mescalero facility does not represent a more serious
inequity than siting it somewhere in the East. This essay shows that all
three arguments are questionable, in part because they rely on historical,
scientific, and ethical flaws in the analyses.
1. PATERNALISM AND THE MESCALERO
Regarding claim (1), Noah Sachs supports the right of the
Mescalero to "host hazardous waste projects if it believes such projects
will be beneficial to it." He argues that it is wrong for paternalistic
opponents to thwart the Mescalero action because he says that the
government should not interfere in "the private venture between the
Mescalero and the utilities." Repeatedly he says that the MRS Mescalero
project is a "private venture."
Sachs is correct insofar as he presupposes that paternalistic
government has no place in purely private actions. However, his claim
(1) is seriously incorrect in alleging that the Mescalero project with the
utilities is a purely private project. It is not private because the United
States government is responsible for the waste, because current United
States citizens could be hurt by it, because members of future generations
are threatened by the waste, and because the gene pool can be impacted
by it. The United States government admits that the waste will be lethal
in perpetuity, and the half-lives of some of the radioactive isotopes (such
as iodine-129) extend into the hundreds of millions of years. Both the
government and the dominant health physics associations admit that the
waste has the potential to hurt present persons, future persons, and the

1. Hans Baer, Kerr-McGee and the NRC: From Indian Country to Silkwood to Gore, 30
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 237-48 (1990); See Paul Schneider, Other People's Trash,
AUDUBON, July-Aug. 1991, at 108-19.
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gene pool.2 As a result, projects involving nuclear waste, because of its
longevity, are among the least private today. Actions with strong
potential to harm other people, innocent third parties, are never private.
The Mescalero may have the right to decide their own fate, but Sachs
seems to forget that they do not have the right to decide the fate of
innocent third parties, such as members of future generations or their
own children.
If Sachs had defined what he meant by "paternalism" or investigated its legal and ethical status, he would have discovered a strong
ethical consensus on at least one point: paternalism to protect innocent
third parties is always ethically required. John Stuart Mill is responsible
for the most stringent safeguards against paternalism; he said it was
justifiable only to protect third parties or to prevent someone from selling
herself into slavery.3 Because sometimes paternalism is ethically required
(to protect other people), dismissing environmental justice arguments as
paternalistic is naive and simplistic. It is simplistic because condemning
interference with projects that a group believes will 'be beneficial to it'
ignores the fact that many such projects are not private.
Sachs' position also ignores much ethical theory of the last 50
years. Ever since at least the Nuremberg Accords, biomedical ethicists
have agreed that it is wrong to experiment on (or to put at serious risk)
medically, socially, or economically disenfranchised people, because it is
so difficult to guarantee that they actually give free informed consent to
the experiments or the risks.4 It is wrong, in other words, because such
people often are unable to engage in completely free transactions or
decisions; they are more constrained by their life situations than many
other people, and these constraints violate the conditions necessary for
free informed consent and therefore for just interactions. As a result,
government has mandated a variety of regulations to protect vulnerable
groups such as children, the aged, the ill, the less educated, prisoners,
and the poor, precisely because their vulnerabilities compromise the
necessary background conditions for pure procedural justice. Their
poverty or lack of education might give them less bargaining power, less

2. See The FederalProgramfor the Disposalof Spent NuclearFueland High-Level Radioactive
Waste: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., (October 2, 1990). See also 1990 Recommendations of the
InternationalComm. on RadiologicalProtection, ICRP PUB. 60, ANN. ICRP 21 (1-3) (1990); The
Principles of Radioactive Waste Management, IAEA Safety Series No. 111-F (1995).
3. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERMENT, chs. 1, 3-5, (1910).
4. See RUTH FADEN AND THOMAS BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT (1986); See also THOMAS BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (1989).
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equal opportunity, and less equal treatment in any societal transaction.5
Or as several environmental justice experts put it: "poverty acts through
the prism of culture."'
In the case of the Mescalero, the absence of state and local
environmental regulations makes them more vulnerable to utilities and
companies seeking waste sites. Their lower-than-average per capita
income also constrains their transactions and negotiations in ways that
threaten both free informed consent and procedural justice. As a result,
when one considers classical ethical analyses of paternalism, the public
impacts of nuclear waste, and the requirements for free informed consent
and procedural justice, it is almost impossible to defend Sachs' position
that paternalism is unjustified in the Mescalero Apache MRS case. The
paternalism is justified precisely because of the public effects of the waste
and because the Mescalero live in a situation where several circumstances
constrain the full requirements for free informed consent and for
procedurally just transactions.
2. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE MESCALERO
Regarding claim (2), Noah Sachs gives two arguments that the
case of the Mescalero MRS does not involve exploitation and bribery and
therefore does not involve environmental injustice. He says (a) that
compensation for hosting an MRS facility is preferable to the alternative,
"compulsive and coercive" methods of siting, and (b) that groups should
be "free to pursue economic options on their own." Sachs' argument (b)
is flawed because, as the previous section argued, no one ought to be free
to pursue economic options that jeopardize the welfare of innocent third
parties. Sachs' argument (b) also begs the question that the siting is truly
a private matter with only private, and not public, consequences.
His argument (a), that compensated is better than compulsory
siting is correct, but it is beside the point. It is beside the point because
no-holds-barred compensated siting and compulsory siting are not the
only two policy options. To assume they are is to commit a fallacy of
bifurcation. Other options, already tried successfully, are to use compensated siting, but to employ constraints to protect vulnerable third parties
and innocent victims.7

5. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90 (1971).
6. Ken Sexton, Kenneth Olden, and Barry Johnson, Environmental justice: the Central
Role of Research in Establishinga Credible Scientific Foundation for Informed Decision Making, 9
TOXIcOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL HEALTH 685, 699 (1993).

7. See, e.g., Elizabeth Peele & Robert Ellis, Hazardous Waste Management Outlook, 2
FORUM FOR APPUED RESEARCH AND PUBLic PoLicY, 68-77 (1987).
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Sachs commits the same fallacy of bifurcation when he asserts
that we cannot advocate "open processes involving fair compensation and
at the same time oppose the projects when poor communities step
forward to host the facility." Indeed, we can, and we do advocate open
processes, and yet we oppose the projects that victimize vulnerable peo-

ple. In cases of medical ethics and rules for experimenting on human
subjects, the laws provide for open processes involving fair compensation, but at the same time do not allow poorly informed, economically
constrained, or socially deprived individuals to volunteer for the

experiments. In virtually every area of public life, people support open
competition and compensation for projects-such as applying for a

job-yet they do not believe that anyone, independent of circumstances
and qualifications, is suitable for those projects. Sachs equates open
competition with the absence of criteria for winning the competition.

Again, in his simple either/or prescription, Sachs' bifurcation presents
a naive and unrealistic account of policy options. Ethics requires analysis,
not simple one-liners or naive either/or choices. Not doing analysis of
ethical theory, Sachs adopts simple two-option conclusions that do not fit
the constraints and complexities of the real world.
Sachs' failure to consider the socioeconomic and political
constraints on the exercise of free informed consent and on pure
procedural justice is puzzling because he admits that the Mescalero
leadership coerced Apache Tribal members at the second referendum on
the MRS. He also admits that people who opposed the facility were likely
to lose their housing and their jobs on the reservation. It is inconsistent
to make such admissions about coercion and, at the same time, to claim
that there was no bribery or exploitation of the Apache people and that
the processes were "open." Likewise, it is inconsistent for Sachs to claim
that the Apache tribe had "decided for itself' about the project and, at the
same time, to admit that the utility, not the Apache members, would
have five of the nine votes on the board running the MRS facility and
that the second Mescalero vote involved intimidation and foul play.
Likewise it is inconsistent for Sachs to claim that the tribe had decided
how "to improve its own welfare," and yet to admit that the title to the
spent fuel could move from the utility to the Tribe, given the approval
of the Tribal Council. Given these admissions, the Tribe hardly is able to
decide for itself matters regarding the facility. Moreover, it is not in the
interests of the Tribe to have title to (and therefore responsibility for) the
waste, if what is at issue is a permanent financial burden-for millions
of years-that either the utilities or the United States government should
bear.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

3. GEOGRAPHICAL INEQUITY AND THE MESCALERO
Regarding claim (3), Noah Sachs asserts that putting the Apache
MRS in New Mexico (where no commercial nuclear waste is created,
instead of in the East, where most of the nuclear reactors are located) is
not unacceptably inequitable. The reason, he says, is that "nuclear waste
facilities, and hazardous facilities in general, impose local burdens and
generalized, benefits. This geographic imbalance can never really be
restored." In this argument, Sachs makes a crucial erroneous assumption:
that because all facilities impose some inequities, therefore there is no
ethical obligation to minimize inequities. He erroneously assumes that
because perfect equity is not possible, therefore people can be as
inequitable as they wish. There are no defensible ethical or logical
grounds for such an assumption.
For at least two reasons, locating the MRS in the West is more
inequitable than locating it in the East. First, the West receives less benefit
than the East from the nuclear-generated electricity that created the
waste, because eastern and western utilities are less likely to buy and sell
excess electricity among themselves than eastern utilities are. Second, the
western United States already has borne a more significant national
burden than the East, because of nuclear weapons testing." It is particularly onerous for Sachs to dismiss the inequities worrying New Mexicans
when he himself is unlikely to suffer from these inequities. His stance
smacks of insensitivity, much like the insensitivity that causes whites to
dismiss the inequities suffered by blacks, and men to dismiss the
inequities suffered by women. Non-victims do not have the right to
dismiss the inequities suffered by victims, particularly when the
inequities can be reduced. Moreover, when non-victims dismiss the inequities suffered by victims, they encourage patterns of abuse to continue.
Factually speaking, Sachs' argument (3) also errs because he
completely ignores the fact that Native Americans bear a disproportionate
environmental burden, and that siting hazardous facilities is not simply
a matter of someone's bearing an inequity. Rather, there has been a

8. AERIcAN NucLEAR GUINEA PIGS: TmEE DECADES OF RADIATION E Ems ON
U.S. CITIZENS. SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY CONSERVATION AND POWER OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY
AND COmmERCE, H.R. Doc. No. (1986). Government liability for Atomic Weapons Testing

Program;Hearings before the Comm. on the Judiciary,U.S. Sen. Sess. (June 27,1986). Cold War
Human Subject Experimentation:Hearing before the Legislation and National Security Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. Doc. 103d Cong., 2d Sess., (Sept. 28, 1994);

Human Subjects Research: Radiation Experimentation:Hearing before the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, Sen. Doc. 103d Cong., 1" Sess. (Jan. 13. 1994).
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continued pattern of disproportionate inequity borne by Native Americans, and Sachs' argument is almost completely insensitive to this point.
4. HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR WASTE ISSUE
Why do Sachs' defenses of the Mescalero MRS project err? In
part, they err because of his failure to integrate relevant nuclear-related
history into his analysis. He ignores the history of the systematic
discrimination and inequities visited on Native Americans, especially by
nuclear-related interests.9 He ignores the history of violations of free
informed consent and procedural justice.
Similarly, Sachs maintains the MRS proposal is flawed in
violating "United States spent fuel disposal policy," but he reveals little
understanding of the way that the history of United States nuclear waste
policy itself is flawed. Criticizing the MRS proposal for being incompatible with United States nuclear waste policy makes sense only if the latter
policy is defensible and reasonable. There already is a consensus that
United States waste policy is a shambles. It is a policy that for half a
century has been characterized by secrecy, deception, and flagrant
violation of environmental laws. The United States Congress and the
United States General Accounting Office have revealed that nearly all
United States Department of Energy nuclear-related sites have soil and
groundwater contamination that violates environmental laws, and their
cleanup will cost approximately $300 billion to $100 trillion. Poor waste
management has occurred at all these facilities, and congressional
hearings have revealed that waste policymakers in the Department of
Energy have withheld safety information, penalized whistleblowers, and
failed to spend the money necessary to avoid radioactive contamination.
As a result, members of Congress have charged that the United States
Department of Energy has lost credibility."0
Apart from environmental violations, mismanagement, and
deception, United States nuclear waste policy is problematic for other
reasons. It is based on highly controversial and subjective judgments
about repository risk." United States waste policy is based on cutting
costs, even when it jeopardizes safety. For example, United States policy

9. See supra notes 1, 8.
10. Safety of U.S. DOE Nuclear Facilities,Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Power
of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R. 101st Cong., 1"Sess. (Feb,22,1989). Federal Facility
Compliance with Hazardous Waste Lows, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Superfund and
Environmental Oversightof the Comm. -on Environment and Public Works, Sen. 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., (Aug. 4, 1988).
11. KRmsri SHRADER-FRXcHETcE, BURYING UNcERTAINTY: RISK AND THE CASE AGAINST
GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 27-159 (1993).
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is based on using single-walled stainless steel waste canisters (that show
long-lived, doublestress corrosion cracking after one year) rather than
12
walled or copper canisters, like the Swedes use.
Implicitly endorsing such questionable aspects of United States
nuclear policy, Sachs assumes that MRS facilities are not desirable
because they are not consistent with the United States waste policy of
permanent disposal. However, MRS facilities allow the nuclear waste to
be monitored, to be retrievable, and to avoid leaks. United States
permanent disposal policy is based on not being able to retrieve the
waste in case of a problem. It also is a policy based on not monitoring the
waste, even though the Department of Energy admits that the waste is
sure to leak." United States waste policy, in other words, is a policy of
jeopardizing future generations-by dumping unmonitored,
nonretrievable, lethal waste into the ground and forgetting about it. It is
a policy of discounting the waste-induced deaths of members of future
generations, in order to make permanent waste disposal appear costeffective. 14 Even the United States National Academy of Sciences has
repeatedly criticized United States waste policy and has said the "DOE
lacked credibility" in siting a permanent facility." The National Academy also has affirmed that it is impossible to predict intrusion into a
permanent waste repository over the next million or more years." Because intrusion is the most likely way to compromise the safety of a
repository, this admission shows that a permanent nuclear facility-whose
waste is not monitored and not retrievable-is not safe and may be less desirable than using MRS facilities whose waste is both monitored and
retrievable. In failing to take account of such facts, Sachs' analysis
ignores both the liabilities of permanent disposal and the assets of MRS
facilities. 7
Just as Sachs' analysis is factually and historically incomplete
when he criticizes the MRS option for being inconsistent with the United
States policy of permanent disposal, so also his analysis is factually and
historically incomplete when he discusses federal responsibility for
nuclear waste. He says the federal government has taken responsibility
for disposal of spent nuclear fuel because the technical challenges are
great and because of the enormous expenditures. However, the federal

12. Id. at 45-46, 77-79.

13. Richard Monastersky, The 20,000-Year Test, SCIENCE NEws, Feb. 27, 1988, at 139.41.
14. SHRADER-FRECHE7E, supra note 11, at 182-212, 241-43.
15. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RE-THIIG HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACIVE WASTE

DISPOSAL, 17 (1990).
16. NATIONAL

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

TECHNICAL

BASES

STANDARDS, 2, 73 (1995).

17. See SHRADER-FRECHErrE, supra note 11, at 213-53.
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government assumed responsibility for radioactive waste primarily
because it wanted to induce utilities to use commercial reactors so that
it would be able to obtain the plutonium byproduct for its weapons
program. To induce industry to use atomic energy, the government
agreed to cover the costs of liability and waste storage. Nuclear generation of electricity would not be economical if rate-payers and utilities had
to cover the cost of waste storage. As spokespersons for the United States
utility industry and congressional documents reveal, all United States
utilities refused to embark on nuclear generation of electricity in the
1950s, because they said that the accidents would bankrupt them and that
waste disposal made nuclear-generated electricity too expensive."8 But
the federal government wanted the reactor byproduct, plutonium, for the
nuclear weapons program, and for this reason agreed to cover the costs
of liability and waste storage for the utilities. 9 As a result, government
picked up the tab for both. It passed the Price-Anderson Act to limit 99
percent of liability in the event of a nuclear disaster, and it °agreed to
have taxpayers cover the costs of radioactive waste disposal.
So long as Sachs and others do not realize the extremely
uneconomical character of nudear-generated electricity, they will not
understand why utilities need to force taxpayers to pay for nucleargenerated electricity and why both government and utilities need to force
people to accept facilities for radioactive waste. According to Nobelwinning physicist Henry Kendall of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, United States government subsidies for commercial nuclear
reactors and waste disposal are now running on the order of $20 billion
per year. According to Kendall, if government removed the $20 billionper-year subsidies, the costs of fission-generated electricity would double.
Already the diseconomies of nuclear power have destroyed it in the
United States; no new reactors have been ordered since 1974.21 In other
words, contrary to Sachs' claim, military goals-in addition to the
diseconomies of nuclear-generated electricity and the inability of
commercial nuclear fission to "pay its own way"-are the main reasons that
the government has picked up the tab for disposal of spent fuel.

18. W.S. Caldwell et al., The ExtraordinaryNuclear OccurrenceThreshhold and Uncompensated Injury under the Price-Anderson Act, VI (2) RUT.-CAM. L.J. 379 (1974); SHRADERFRECHETrE, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBUC POLICY 8-11 (1983).
19. SHELDON NOVIci, The Electric War, 22 (1976) (quoting Carl Walske of the Atomic
Industrial Forum); M. WILLmCH, GLOBAL POLrTICs OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 5-6 (1971).
20. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 11, at 96-98; SHRADER-FRECHETE, supra note 17, at

49-59.
21. Henry Kendall, CallingNuclear Power to Account, 18 CALYPSO LoG, October 1991 at
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5. SCIENCE RELEVANT TO THE NUCLEAR WASTE ISSUE
Sachs' arguments about the Mescalero proposal also err because
of scientific problems with his arguments. He claims that the MRS
proposal is flawed because it would force utilities and their customers to
"pay twice" for storage, because the monies spent for the MRS would be
in addition to the $5 billion that utilities have already paid into the
federal Nuclear Waste Fund. Sachs ignores the fact, however, that the
entire United States taxpaying public has provided hundreds of billions
of dollars of subsidies for nuclear utilities and radioactive waste storage,
and that nuclear utilities only pay a small fraction of the cost of waste
storage. In the last 10 years the beneficiaries of nuclear power (utilities
and rate-payers) have paid $5 billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund,
whereas United States taxpayers have contributed $200 billion (or $20
billion per year) in subsidies (in part for waste disposal) to these same
nuclear interests?2
If Sachs is going to make an equity argument, he needs to
recognize that utilities and rate-payers have never paid, even once, for
waste storage. The burden has been borne by taxpayers. Because the
government has released nuclear utilities from liability for nuclear
accidents (through the Price-Anderson Acts) and for waste-related accidents, the taxpaying public is being treated unfairly because of nuclear
power and nuclear waste. The utilities and the rate-payers are not paying
their own way. The victims are United States taxpayers, not the utilities,
because the taxpayers are covering hundreds of billions of dollars of
waste-storage subsidies. Without the military incentives for the sweetheart deal that gave nuclear utilities heavy subsidies for nucleargenerated electricity, there would be no nuclear power in the United
States. Sachs appears not to know this fact, and his call for justice, for not
making the utilities and ratepayers "pay twice" for waste storage, is
wrong. The point is important because, given the nuclear program cost
overruns, the expense of waste disposal, and the diseconomies of
commercial nuclear fission, there are likely to be additional financial
pressures to cut costs and to jeopardize safety at either MRS facilities or
permanent repositories.
Sachs also errs in criticizing using the MRS option because it
takes "the pressure off the federal government to seek sound long-term
solutions to the waste problem." Sachs' argument here begs the question
of whether there are sound long-term solutions to the waste problem. If
all the previous arguments and data given are correct, MRS solutions
22. Id.; see also SHRADER-FREcHEm, supra note 11, at 144; SHRADER-FRECHETrE, supra
note 17.
23. Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988,42 U.S.C. 2011(j), 2210 (1988).
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may be the only solutions to radioactive waste. Moreover, no state is
willing to accept a permanent repository, and 80'percent of Nevadans are
militantly opposed to current plans for the Yucca Mountain repository.24
Besides, as already mentioned, if a recent report of the United States
National Academy of Sciences is correct, there may be no long-term
solutions, because it is impossible to predict repository intrusion over the
next million years.25 Because future generations, in principle, cannot
consent to the risk being imposed on them, because permanent disposal
allows less monitoring and retrievability than MRS, and because there is
so much uncertainty regarding permanent disposal, there are strong
grounds for opting for MRS over permanent disposal.' The problem
with the Mescalero proposal, however, is that it violates norms of free
informed consent, procedural justice, and environmental justice, for all
the reasons already given. For Sachs to argue against MRS because it
conflicts with the current policy of permanent disposal thus ignores the
many problems with the current policy.
6. ETHICS RELEVANT TO THE NUCLEAR WASTE ISSUE
Sachs also errs when he argues that society puts limits on parties
who are negotiating contracts whenever the contracts "violate societal
moral standards." Sachs then says that such limits are the results of what
society finds "deplorable" or "undesirable," but that judgments of what is
"deplorable" are not sufficient to justify paternalism in the Mescalero case.
Although Sachs is correct that mere judgments about what is
undesirable or deplorable are not sufficient to justify paternalism, he is
wrong when he speaks about societal legal foundations. Sachs errs because he appears to believe that government imposes limits on people
purely because of "societal moral standards" or emotive judgments about
what is "deplorable." What he fails to realize is that government puts
limits on actions not for such superficial reasons, but mainly because
people have rights to justice, inalienable human rights to justice, to equal
treatment, to fair play, and to due process. Regardless of what society's
standards are, these moral rights exist. Moral rights for blacks in South
Africa existed even when the white societal standards did not legally
recognize them. Moral rights for blacks in the United States existed even
before the white society formally recognized them. Discrimination in contracts is wrong not merely because "societal standards" say it is wrong,

24. Paul Slovic, James Flynn, & Mark Layman, Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of
Nuclear Waste, 254 SCIENcE, Dec. 13, 1991, at 1604.
25. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, supra note 16, at 73.

26. SHRADER-FREcHETTE, supra note 11, at 160-253.
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but because discrimination violates basic, innate standards and human
rights governing justice and equal treatment.
7. CONCLUSION
Sachs fails to grasp that environmental ethics is not just about
what is "deplorable" or "undesirable," but mainly about human rights and
justice, things that society may ignore, but things that society cannot destroy. Sachs fails to grasp the merit and power of environmental ethics,
and indeed, throughout his entire essay, he does not cite one ethicist,
even though the essay alleges it is about environmental ethics. In part
because he discusses virtually no ethical theory, Sachs ignores the
inalienable human rights and duties that ground ethics. He ignores the
biomedical ethics precedents for paternalism in the MRS case, and he
takes a position that is not defensible in terms of contemporary norms
requiring free informed consent. He appears willing to count virtually
anything as a case of consent to some situation or policy. If there are
government-imposed limits on free informed consent in cases such as
biomedical ethics, why is it wrong to consider government-imposed
limits on free informed consent in cases of technological and environmental ethics? Sachs never answers this question. His omission is telling. The
biomedical ethics that protects experimental subjects is the same as the
environmental ethics that ought to protect victims of radioactive waste.
For those who understand ethics, the Mescalero MRS is a classic case of
environmental injustice.

